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Abstract— In this paper we introduce a test through which
the responsiveness of a TCP aggregate can be measured.
The first introduced test is based on dropping a few packets
from the aggregate and measuring the resulting rate de-
crease of that aggregate. This kind of test is not robust to
multiple simultaneous tests performed at different routers.
Extensions are done to make the test robust to multiple
simultaneous tests by inspiring from the CDMA approach
in the literature of multiple access channels in the commu-
nication theory. The measurements of responsiveness can
be utilized for different purposes like congestion control or
mitigating a Distributed Denial of Service Attack.
I. Introduction
A key characteristic of TCP traffic is its responsiveness
to packet drops. This forms the basis for congestion con-
trol. The degree to which a TCP aggregate reduces its
rate in response to packet drops depends on packet size,
roundtrip time and the distribution of window sizes among
the constituent flows. An aggregate may also include non-
cooperative or malicious flows that do not participate in the
TCP congestion control algorithm. Such flows are called
nonconformant.
The goal of this paper is to introduce a technique for
quantifying the responsiveness of a TCP aggregate to
packet drops and for estimating the fraction of traffic that
is nonconformant. Such a technique is useful for congestion
control based on random early drop (RED). With quanti-
tative information about the responsiveness of TCP traf-
fic, when a router gets close to congestion it will know how
many drops are needed to keep the rate of the traffic within
the capacity of its outgoing links.
Another application is to the mitigation of distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks. As perpetrators become
more sophisticated, it can be anticipated that DDoS at-
tacks will become increasingly stealthy with attack traffic
designed to closely resemble ordinary Internet traffic. Stud-
ies show that more than 90 percent of the Internet traffic
is generated by TCP traffic sources [4]. Furthermore, http
traffic accounts for more than 42 percent of current traf-
fic, while the average amount of packets exchanged per
http flow is on the order of 10 packets. Consequently, a
stealthy attacker might well choose to clog access links by
generating large numbers of short-lived TCP flows. Such
flows would be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic;
they would also be difficult to trace back. Even if an at-
tack source generated packets over a significant duration of
time, by changing the spoofed source address or the source
port number it could make the traffic appear to be com-
posed of many small flows.
In order to mitigate DDoS attacks, it is desirable to have
the capability to filter attack flows at backbone routers.
However, it is not practical to filter at the granularity of
individual flows. This is especially true when there are
many small flows that consume a considerable percentage
of bandwidth overall, but each of which lasts for a short
period of time. An attack flow may have ended before it
can be identified and filtered. A more practical alterna-
tive is to partition the traffic into a number of aggregates,
identify those aggregates that contain a significant amount
of attack traffic and filter a portion of these aggregates in
order to reduce the effects of the attack.
To make aggregate-based filtering feasible, it is necessary
to be able to estimate what proportion of traffic in an ag-
gregate is likely to have been generated by attack sources.
For stealthy attacks generating TCP packets, there may be
no obvious characteristics that identify the attack packets
as such. However, it is reasonable to assume that flows
generated by attackers will differ from benign flows by fail-
ing to conform to TCP congestion control. Consequently,
the problem of estimating the proportion of attack traffic
in an aggregate can be reformulated as the problem of es-
timating the proportion of nonconformant traffic in a TCP
aggregate.
In general terms, our approach is to perturb the arrival
rate of the aggregate by intentionally dropping a small
number of packets. By doing this periodically, the respon-
siveness of the aggregate under normal conditions can be
determined. Then if a test indicates that the responsiveness
of the aggregate has decreased, the presence of an attack
can be inferred and the proportion of attack traffic can be
estimated.
There are two difficulties that must be overcome in order
to enable this approach to work. The first problem is that
because of variations in the round trip times of flows, the
perturbation of the arrival rate as a result of packet drops is
spread out over time. We are able to overcome this problem
by considering the integral of the rate decrease over time.
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The second problem is more challenging and is concerned
with distributed implementation. Each router should be
able to apply perturbations and use these perturbations to
determine the responsiveness of the aggregates it sees, ei-
ther for the purposes of congestion control or to estimate
the proportion of malicious traffic in a DDoS attack. How-
ever, the flows in an aggregate may experience perturba-
tions at multiple routers. In a distributed implementation,
in order to perform its estimation, a router should not need
to be aware of the perturbations applied by other routers.
Our approach to solving this second problem is inspired by
the direct sequence spread spectrum (CDMA) approach
to multiple access communication channels. Each router
is assigned a dropping signature that specifies its packet
dropping rate as a function of time. Different routers are
assigned signatures that are orthogonal in a certain sense.
Using simulations, we show that this approach enables each
individual router to compute an accurate estimate of the
proportion of nonconformant traffic that it sees without re-
quiring any information to be shared among routers.
One final issue that we address has to do with the po-
tential interaction between the applied perturbations and
the effects of congestion-induced drops. Our approach as-
sumes that the random process describing the window size
of each TCP flow is a stationary random process. If con-
gestion is building up, this assumption is no longer valid.
Thus, for the DDoS application, the approach is intended
to be applied in the initial stage of an attack before sig-
nificant congestion-induced dropping occurs near the vic-
tim(s). Our simulations indicate that the method provides
an accurate estimate of the proportion of nonconformant
traffic as long as the bottleneck link utilization does not
exceed about 80 percent of the outgoing link capacity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe related work. In Section III, we de-
rive mathematical formulas for the rate decrease of a con-
formant aggregate in response to dropping a small number
of packets. In Section IV, we use these results to obtain
an estimator for the TCP conforming component of an ag-
gregate. In Section V, we describe how the use of CDMA-
inspired orthogonal perturbing signatures enables multiple
routers to perform perturbations without mutual interfer-
ence. In Section VI, we give more explore the possible ap-
plications of APM and CAPM in more detail. In Section
VII, the results of the simulation experiments are presented
which confirm the efficacy of the proposed method.
II. Related Work
Many researchers have conducted studies to do identifi-
cation and modeling of TCP traffic in granularity of flow
under steady state conditions. In [1] the authors propose
a method of testing a flow by comparing the steady state
throughput of a TCP flow with the theoretical predicted
value for conforming flows. If the response and model are
similar, the flow is called TCP conformant. The objective
of that study is to identify and penalize the non-conformant
flows for congestion control purposes. The approach in
[1] describes how large sustained individual flows may be
tested for TCP conformance. However, a significant per-
cent of the Internet traffic may be composed by short lived
flows. Stochastic Fair Blue (SFB) is proposed in [11], and
it offers per flow test for responsiveness by mapping dif-
ferent flows to the parallel bins. The approach is based on
the fact that the bins containing a non-conforming flow are
likely to be overloaded. However, if there are many non-
conforming flows in a traffic aggregate, it is likely that all
bins are overloaded, and the algorithm will not be able to
distinguish between conforming and nonconforming flows.
There are many other works dealing with the TCP dy-
namics and its throughput analysis. In [10] the authors
have offered the throughput model for a TCP traffic under
assumption of stationary random losses. In [7] authors offer
a flow based analysis of TCP dynamics in the Active Queue
Management(AQM) routers by using stochastic differential
equations.
III. Mathematical Formulation
To introduce the Aggregate Perturbation Method, we
need to study how a TCP aggregate responds to packet
drops in the network. To do so, we start with definitions
of a flow and an aggregate:
Definition 1: A flow is a stream of data packets with the
same source, destination and application, traversing along
the same path.
Definition 2: An aggregate is a set of flows that have at
least one link or node in common in their path from source
to destination, and all packets belonging to these flows have
a common property.
To define an aggregate in a more precise way, we have to
define the common property of flows that belong to that
aggregate. An example of an aggregate is all FTP flows
that pass through a router.
Now we will continue by making some further assumptions
about a given aggregate:
A1: The aggregate is composed of TCP flows that conform
to TCP-Reno congestion control.
A2: All TCP flows in the aggregate are in the congestion
avoidance phase.
A3: The random process describing the window size of
each TCP flow is a stationary random process. We call
this stationary random process W (t).
Assumption A1 is a key assumption since it states how
a flow decreases its rate as a response to packet drops.
TCP Reno has two different phases known as slow start
and congestion avoidance. Slow start begins after making
a connection, and upon successful transmission of every
packet and receiving acknowledgement from the receiver
the window size is increased by one. Congestion avoidance
starts after the window size exceeds a threshold value, and
in this phase the window size is increased one per round
trip time, and upon experiencing a drop it is decreased to
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half its current value. By stating A3, we have assumed
each TCP flow in the aggregate is in steady-state. This
assumption is consistent with A2. Now we can state and
prove the following lemma about the response of the aggre-
gate when we drop D packets from it. For the purpose of
this lemma, the packet size B and roundtrip time R are as-
sumed constant. The extension to variable roundtrip times
is described later.
Lemma 1: Assume a TCP traffic aggregate satisfying
A1-A3. Let λ(t) be the instantaneous arrival rate of this
aggregate. If D packets are dropped from the aggregate
instantaneously at time t = 0, and if D is small compared
to the number of flows in the aggregate, then the aggre-
gate will experience the following average instantaneous





where t1 > 0 is the time at which the aggregate experi-
ences its minimum rate as a result of packet drops, and
∆λ(t) = λ(t) − λ(0−) for any t > 0.
Proof: Assume at time t the number of active flows in
the aggregate is N(t). Furthermore, let pj(t) denote the
unconditional probability that the window size of a flow at
time t is equal to j. Then we will have the following for





where λk(t) is the incoming arrival rate of traffic of the kth
flow belonging to the aggregate at time t. Since we have
assumed D << N(t), we may conclude that the probability
of receiving multiple drops by the same flow is small, and so
D flows receive drops. We call these flows {f1, f2, . . . , fD}.
Assume for a flow fi, the window size at time t is Wfi (t),
the instantaneous rate is λfi(t) and the decrease in the
instantaneous rate as a result of dropping one packet is
∆λfi (t). Since the overall instantaneous decrease in the
rate of the aggregate is sum of the rate decreases for the





From the symmetry of the problem with respect to
{f1, f2, . . . , fD}, we can conclude that the D random vari-
ables {∆λf1(t), ∆λf2 (t), . . . , ∆λfD (t)} are identically dis-




E[∆λfi (t)] = DE[∆λf1 (t)] (4)




E[∆λf1(t)|Wf1 (0) = j]P (Wf1(0) = j)
(5)
Using assumption A1 and A2 recall that we are dealing
with TCP Reno compatible version of TCP. Hence, upon
receiving a single drop, a TCP flow that is in congestion
avoidance phase does not revert to slow start, but continues
in congestion avoidance phase and halves its window size
[6], [3]. Furthermore, this reduction happens by receiving
a duplicate ACK of the dropped packet by the sender. So
rate reduction happens at the sender at a time that is a
fraction of round trip time R, but the router that did the
drops observes the rate decrease for flow f1 at time t1 that
theoretically is around the round trip time R. Since in the
congestion avoidance phase the window size of a TCP flow
cannot grow more than one per round trip time, we can
see Wf1(t
−
1 ) ≤ Wf1(0) + 1, so Wf1(t−1 ) ≈ Wf1 (0). Then as
a result of halving the window size we will have Wf1 (t1) ≈
Wf1(0)/2. Hence




It should be noted that since we have assumed the round
trip times of all flows are the same, the time at which
the aggregate experiences its minimum rate as a result
of drops at t = 0 is t1, the same as the time at which
the f1, f2, . . . , fD experience their minimum rate. After t1
flows start to recover their rates.
The other term in (5) can be written in the following
way:




The numerator of (7) is proportional to the number of pack-
ets generated by the flows with window size j in some time
interval around t = 0, while the denominator is propor-
tional to the number of packets generated by all flows in
the same time interval. So given a packet drop, the prob-
ability that this packet belongs to a flow of window size j
is given by (7).
Substituting (7) and (6) in (5) gives:












The result follows immediately from (4) and (8). QED
In the proof, we have made use of stationary assumption
A3, and so the expectations in the middle term of (8) are
independent of time. This is true as long as the flows be-
longing to the aggregate are in their congestion avoidance
state. It is straightforward to use similar proof to extend
the above result to the case in which the flows forming
the aggregate do not have the same round trip times. In
this case, the rate reduction of different flows that received
drops does not happen at the same time, and the rate re-
ductions happen as smaller decreases spread over time. By
using a similar derivation, it follows that in this case the







in which R is the random variable describing the round trip
time of a packet belonging to a flow in the aggregate.
Now, we can make the following useful observations
about the equation (1):
Remark 1: The amount of rate decrease as a result of
dropping D packets from the aggregate is independent of
the absolute instantaneous rate of aggregate λ(t), and the
number of flows contributing to the aggregate N(t).
Remark 2: The rate decrease shows a linear behavior
versus the number of dropped packets D. Later we will
see how this linearity helps us to define a simple estimator
of the portion of the aggregate which is not responsive to
packet drops or congestion control. It is important to no-
tice that this linearity is valid if D << N(t)
Since equation (1) only gives the instantaneous rate de-
crease, it is useful to study how the aggregate responds
over time after drops. For this purpose, and under the
same terms as Lemma 1, we can state:
Lemma 2: Assume A1 and A3 are true for a traffic
aggregate. If we drop D packets from this aggregate at
time t = 0, and D is small compared to the number of
flows in the aggregate, then the average decrease in the
rate of aggregate at time t > 0 is:
E[∆λ(t)] = −BD
R
Θ(FW , t) (10)
where FW is the probability density function of window
size W (t) and Θ(., .) is a nonnegative known function.
Proof: The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 1.
Observe that similar to (6), for a flow f1 that has received
a drop at time t = 0 we can write:
E[∆λf1 (t)|Wf1 (0) = j] =
B
R
E[Wf1 (t)−Wf1(0)|Wf1 (0) = j]
(11)
But E[Wf1(t)|Wf1 (0) = j] describes how the window size
of a flow is increased after receiving a single drop at time
t = 0 from a given initial condition Wf1 (0) = j, and it is
independent of B, D and R. The statement of Lemma 2 is
proved by substituting (11) and (7) in (5). It can be seen
that Θ(FW , t) can be written in the following way:
Θ(FW , t) =
∑∞




In this case it is hard to find a closed form for Θ(FW , t)
for an arbitrary time t. However, the comments given in
Remark 1 and Remark 2 are still true, and those are the
facts that we will use later to introduce an estimator of the
TCP Conforming Component of an Aggregate.
For the case of different round trip times, we will have a
similar statement:
E[∆λ(t)] = −BDΘ1(GWR, t) (13)
in which GWR is the joint PDF of Window size W (t) and
the round trip time R, and Θ1(., .) is a nonnegative func-
tion. For the analytical results in the remainder of the
paper, we will limit our attention to the case in which
the round trip times are constant, but the results can be
logically extended for the case with different round trip
times. The simulation experiments include variable round
trip times.
IV. Estimating TCP Conforming Component of
an Aggregate (APM)
We recall that a TCP flow is said to be conformant if it
responds to packet drops in the manner prescribed by the
congestion control algorithm of TCP-Reno. The results of
the preceding section predict the response of an aggregate
consisting entirely of conformant TCP flows to a perturba-
tion consisting of a small number of packet drops. In this
section, we describe how it can be used to estimate the pro-
portion of conformant traffic in an arbitrary aggregate of
TCP flows. This estimator works based on either a single
pass or multiple pass test on the aggregate.
Equation (1) suggests the basis of an algorithm for test-
ing an aggregate: At time t = 0 some randomly selected
packets are dropped from the aggregate. Based on the com-
parison of the observed decrease of the aggregate rate to
the expected decrease, the non-conforming component of
the traffic can then be estimated. One important problem
that should be solved is the values of E[W 2] and E[W ]
which are not known in advance by the algorithm. But the
algorithm can simply do some test and observations during
the normal conditions when all traffic is assumed confor-
mant and estimate the ratio E[W 2]/E[W ].
Another practical difficulty of using equation (1) arises
when we need to measure the absolute value of rate de-
crease as a result of packet drops. Equation (1) assumes
that the router observes all responses simultaneously, but
there may be some mismatch in the time that different flows
respond to packet drops. This problem becomes more ob-
vious when the round trip times of different flows are not
the same. In this case the responses of each of the indi-
vidual flows that have received drops may be spread out in
time, and (10) gives the sum of these smaller rate decreases
which happen at different times.
To overcome this problem we define another metric to
measure the degradation of the aggregate as a result of




(λ(0−) − λ(t)) dt (14)
tr is a nonnegative finite time, and it can be chosen to
be the minimum time for the recovery of all flows that
received drops, and λ(0−) is the instantaneous rate at the
moment before dropping the first packet. To get better
results, λ(0−) may be replaced by a short-term average of
5
the rate of aggregate in a time interval earlier than t = 0.
η(D) is simply a measure of how many more packets could
have been sent by the aggregate if we had not dropped D









Θ(FW , t) dt (16)
Practically, it is hard to find closed form expressions for
θ(FW ) defined in (16). But as a matter of fact, for our
purpose it is not necessary to have such closed form ex-
pressions. In our algorithm, both E[W 2]/E[W ] or θ(FW )
should be estimated during the normal conditions of the
network. Fortunately, E[η(D)] is still independent of the
number of flows in the aggregate N(t) and the absolute
rate of traffic λ(t). In addition, η(D) is a linear function
of D. These properties of η(D) help us to define a sim-
ple and scalable tool to estimate how much an aggregate is
responsive to packet drops. It is important to notice that
tr is a parameter of the estimator, and it should not nec-
essarily be the minimum time for the recovery of all flows
that received drops. A smaller or larger value of tr still
preserves linear dependence of E[η(D)] on D. However,
a shorter value means discarding some useful information
and a longer value means adding more noise and variance
to the observation of η(D).
Now we can continue toward introducing the estimator
of the non-responsive component of an aggregate. Assume
the TCP-conforming component of the traffic aggregate
sends its traffic with unknown rate λT (t). Likewise, the
non-TCP-conforming component sends its traffic with rate
λN (t). Obviously we have λT (t) + λN (t) = λ(t), and λ(t)
is completely observable. For the purpose of estimating
λT (t) and λN (t), at time t = 0, we drop D packets from
the aggregate randomly. Then let the conformant compo-




λN (t) + λT (t)
D = ρD (17)
in which ρ = λT (t)λN (t)+λT (t) is the fraction of aggregate that is
TCP conforming. Since the nonconforming part does not
respond to packet drops, the rate decrease of the entire ag-
gregate is equal to the rate decrease of the TCP-conforming
component of that aggregate, which by using equation (15)





We use equation (18) to construct an estimator for the ratio
of the aggregate traffic that is conformant. Let ρ̄ denote the
estimate of this ratio. Note, in (18), η(D) is fully observ-
able and can be measured by using (14) after dropping D
packets. Using (18), we will define the following estimator







It should be noted that in (19), the value of RBθ(FW ) is
constant and independent of D. So it can be estimated
during the normal conditions of the network where the ag-
gregate is fully conformant to TCP congestion control when
ρ = 1. This quantity can be used later to estimate ρ. In or-
der to decrease the variance of the estimator, multiple tests
may be performed to achieve a more accurate estimate of
ρ. We call this estimation method Aggregate Perturbation
Method or APM.
V. Orthogonal Perturbing Signatures (CAPM)
One of the problems of distributed implementation of
APM is the potential of simultaneous perturbations. The
measurements of a perturbing router on an aggregate can
be falsified by the simultaneous perturbations of a down-
stream or upstream router. In this section we introduce
CAPM to overcome this problem. In CAPM every per-
turbing router uses a unique perturbing pattern. We will
show that under proper assignment of the perturbing pat-
terns and proper definition of aggregate degradation mea-
sure for each perturbing router, the test and measurment
of each router will be robust to the interference caused by
the other simultaneous perturbing routers.
Assume at time t1 < t we drop D1 packets and at time
t2 < t we drop D2 packets from the aggregate. We are
interested in the resulting average rate decrease E[∆λ(t)]
at time t. If D = D1 +D2 is small enough compared to the
number of flows in the aggregate, then we expect that the
likelihood of receiving multiple drops by the same flow is
small enough, so the two perturbations independently de-
grade the rate of aggregate, and the decrease in the rate of
aggregate at time t is the superposition of the two degra-
dations. So based on the result of Lemma 2, we will have




(Θ(FW , t − t1) + Θ(FW , t − t2)). (20)
In (20) the first term on the right hand side is due to D1
drops at time t1 and the second term due to D2 drops at
time t2. Obviously, the above argument is valid if we have
more than two perturbations.
Now we can make the drops more spread out on a given
interval [0, T ], and distribute them in a uniform or non-
uniform way over that interval. For this case, let nonnega-
tive function r(t) be the number of drops per unit time at
time t ∈ [0, T ]. In other words, the packet drops are the
output of a Poisson Process with variable rate r(t). This
means for a small enough interval of length ∆t belonging
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to [0, T ] the probability of a single packet drop is approx-
imately r(t)∆t. We call r(t) a drop signature or a drop
pattern.
Under the same terms of Lemma 1, we can state the fol-
lowing lemma:
Lemma 3: Assume we have a traffic aggregate for
which assumptions A1 and A3 are valid. We drop the
packets of this aggregate with rate r(t) for t > 0, and
assume that r(t) is small enough such that a single flow is






r(τ)Θ(FW , t − τ) dτ. (21)
Proof: Denote Dr(I) to be the random variable describ-
ing the number of packet drops in interval I ⊆ [0, T ]. Now
fix t, and consider k + 1 time values t0 = 0 < t1 < t2 <
. . . < tk = t. Define Ij = [tj , tj+1] for 0 ≤ j < k. If we
assume the length of Ij is small enough, then we can think
of Dr(Ij) packet drops in that interval as Dr(Ij) instan-
taneous drops at the beginning of interval tj . Then drops
in Ij make the following contribution to the aggregate rate
decrease at time t:




Note that in the middle term of (22) we have used iterated
expectations, where the outer expectation is with respect
to Dr(Ij), and inner expectation is with respect to ∆λ(t).
Now recall that we have assumed that length of Ij is small
enough, so we can assume r(t) has almost a constant value
over this interval (to be more precise, we should assume
r(t) is continuous on [0, T ], except for a finite set of points).
Then [Dr(Ij)] ≈ (tj+1 − tj)r(tj). Hence:
E[∆λ(t)] ≈ −B(tj+1 − tj)r(tj)
R
Θ(FW , t − tj). (23)
Since the value of E[∆λ(t)] given in (23) is the contribution
to the rate decrease of aggregate by drops in interval Ij ,
from the superposition property stated in (20), the total







Θ(FW , t − tj). (24)
Now let k → ∞ in a way such that maxj(tj+1 − tj) → 0.
Then the summation in (24) tends to the following convo-





r(τ)Θ(FW , t − τ) dτ (25)
which is the claimed result. QED
Remark 3: The system with input r(t) and output
E[∆λ(t)] is a linear time invariant system with the im-
pulse response −BR Θ(FW , t).
From the linearity proved in Lemma 3 we can expect that
the effect of multiple simultaneous perturbations made by
different drop signatures additively show up in the rate of
aggregate in average sense. For instance, if we perturb the
aggregate with rate r1(t) in one experiment that results
in rate decrease of ∆λ1(t), and in another experiment we
use r2(t) that causes rate decrease of ∆λ2(t), then if we
perturb the traffic with rate r(t) = r1(t) + r2(t) in a third
experiment, we will expect the average rate decrease to be
E[∆λ(t)] = E[∆λ1(t)] + E[∆λ2(t)]. Later in this section
we will see how we can take advantage of this property to
permit multiple perturbing routers.
For the case of using drop signature r(t), we define the





in which h(t) is a weighting function that states at what
time instants the results are more important to us, and at
what time instants we are less interested in the rate de-
crease of aggregate. Based on the result of Lemma 3 and
the linearity of the ηh(r) in ∆λ(t), it can be observed that
E[ηh(r)] is linearly dependent on the drop signature r(t).
Now we try to use an approach similar to Direct Se-
quence Spread Spectrum CDMA in multiple access com-
munication to solve interfering problems of multiple simul-
taneous perturbing routers. In this approach, each router
perturbs the traffic according to its unique CDMA code. In
this case, the drop signature of the ith perturbing router




cjpTc(t − (j − 1)Tc) = Aisi(t) (27)
in which, Ai is a known perturbation amplitude of the ith
router, N is a positive integer called the spreading factor,
Tc = T/N , (c1, c2, . . . , cN ) is a binary sequence assigned to
the particular router known as the code of the user. In (27),
si(t) denotes the normalized drop signature, and pTc(t) is
a real-valued function known as the chip waveform and it
satisfies the following property:
∫ ∞
−∞
pTc(t)pTc(t − nTc) dt = 0, n = 1, 2, . . . . (28)
The estimation of the ith router about the conformance
of the aggregate is made based on the Matched Filter out-
put. The matched filter output is the value of ηh(ri) eval-






Since in our problem ri(t) is a drop rate, it should be non-
negative, and hence pTc(t) should be nonnegative. For this




1 if 0 < t < Tc
0 otherwise. (30)
Usually, in the CDMA systems assignment of the codes is
very important. Users with a potential of high interfer-
ence (e.g., neighbor routers in our problem) are assigned
to codes that cause their drop signatures to be orthogonal
(or close to orthogonal)
∫ T
0
si(t)sj(t) dt = 0, for i = j. (31)
Unfortunately, the statement of (31) cannot be satisfied
with the current definition of drop signatures defined in
(27). That is because both si(t) and sj(t) are nonnegative
rate functions, and hence the integral defined in (31) can
never be zero. We can solve this problem with a minor
change of the orthogonality requirement and the structure
of the matched filter. First, we replace the orthogonality
condition with a similar condition in which the normalized






j (t) dt = 0, for i = j (32)
in which xa(t) is x(t) after eliminating its DC component
over [0, T ]:





Furthermore, we change the matched filter output for the






sai (t)∆λ(t) dt (34)
yi is the value of ηh in (26) evaluated for h(t) = sai (t). One
important note about notation ηh(r) in (34) and (26) is
that in both equations r is the total perturbing function,
since the rate decrease (λ(0−)−λ(t)) is affected by this to-
tal drop rate. Hence r(t) =
∑
k rk(t), where k is an index
that covers the set of all perturbations that the aggregate
experiences. Now we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 4: Assume assumptions A1 and A3 are valid
for a traffic aggregate, and assume that the overall drop
rate r(t) =
∑
k rk(t) is small enough such that a single
flow is unlikely to experience another drop before recovery
from a previous one. Furthermore the rate of change of
each perturbation rk(t) is small enough compared to the
response time of the aggregate. Then under orthogonality






Proof: Denote ∆λx(t) to be the rate change of aggregate
when the aggregate is perturbed with drop rate x(t). By








From the result of Lemma 3 and linearity of E[∆λr(t)] in
r(t) we can conclude















To complete the proof, it suffices to prove E[ηsa
i
(rj)] = 0
for j = i. We have rj(t) = Ajsj(t). Now we use the as-
sumption that rj(t) changes slower than the aggregate re-
sponse time. Hence rj(t) can be approximated by using
a piecewise constant function. For an interval on which
rj(t) is constant, the traffic aggregate responds and set-
tles down to a value. In the next interval rj(t) jumps to
a new value, and so E[∆λrj (t)] responds accordingly, and
after experiencing a small transient time settles down to
a new steady state value. According to the linearity re-
sult of Lemma 3 the steady state value of E[∆λrj (t)] on
each interval is proportional to the constant value of rj(t)
on that interval. This means that E[∆λrj (t)] tracks the
piecewise constant shape of rj(t). So by ignoring the short
transients of E[∆λrj (t)] at the beginning of each interval
we will have:
E[∆λrj (t)]≈Cjrj(t) = CjAj(sdj + saj (t)) (39)
in which sdj is the DC component of sj(t) over interval







rj (t)] dt. (40)
Substituting (39) in (40) and using orthogonality assump-
tion of (32) yields: E[ηsa
i
(rj)] = 0. QED




−) dt = 0 (41)
And so we have the following simple equation for the output




sai (t)λ(t) dt (42)
Now we continue toward defining an estimator of non-
conformant portion of the TCP aggregate. From (25),(26)
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and (35), we have the following expression for the average











si(τ)Θ(FW , t − τ) dτ dt (43)
Equation (44) gives the basis for the estimator of non-








si(τ)Θ(FW , t − τ) dτ dt. (44)
Notice that Ki is a coefficient that describes how much
the aggregate is responsive to packet drops. We call this
quantity the response coefficient of the aggregate. For a
fully conformant aggregate we have:
E[yi] = AiKi (45)
With an argument similar to that in Section (IV), we can
derive the following formula for the case the aggregate is
not fully conformant to congestion control:
E[yi] = ρAiKi (46)
in which ρ is the ratio of the bandwidth of conformant
portion to the bandwidth of the aggregate. Then we will





Note that yi is fully observable, and it can easily be mea-
sured by using (42). The amplitude of perturbing function
Ai is known to the router that does perturbation. Finding
the Ki is the only problem of the estimator. This coeffi-
cient can be estimated during the times that we know the
aggregate is fully conformant (i.e., ρ = 1). Or it can be
estimated by a long term average of yi/Ai. Once Ki is es-
timated, we use (47) to estimate ρ for times it is unknown
(for instance during a DDoS attack or a flash crowd time).
There are some key issues about how to choose the value
of Tc. As stated before, Tc should be long enough such
that the rate decrease of aggregate as a result of packet
drops in one chip duration can show up, and the aggre-
gate rate settles down. On the other hand, too large Tc
does not improve the performance of estimator, and it only
causes longer test and more packet drops, which causes the
test to be more expensive. The value of N may be chosen
according to the maximum number of simultaneous per-
turbing users and the maximum tolerable interference in
the system. In contrast to the cellular systems, security of
the codes is not a major concern in our problem, however,
there is no limitation on defining long signature sequences,
and adding security features to the assigned codes.
We have called this method CAPM that stands for
CDMA based APM.
Fig. 1. The typical topology of network from the perspective of a
DDoS victim
VI. Applications of APM and CAPM
A.DDoS Defense
Based on the results of Section (IV) and Section (V), we
can define a method to minimize the effects of a DDoS at-
tack that employs TCP packets. The basic idea of such a
defense policy is rooted in the fact that the traffic sent by
the DDoS sources over the Internet is not TCP-conforming.
Assume we have a victim, and suspect traffic being for-
warded to it. From the perspective of the victim, the net-
work can be viewed as a tree as seen in figure 1. The traffic
is generated at sources denoted Si. The traffic traverses
intermediate routers at which APM or CAPM is imple-
mented. The main, and unique, property of the defense
policy based on APM or CAPM is that the intermediate
routers do not use any downstream feedback, statistical or
otherwise, in order to determine the special characteristics
or attack signature of the malicious traffic. This allows us
to have a proactive defense to protect the victim before it
is significantly impacted by the attack.
Our DDoS defense is based on dividing the traffic at the
intermediate nodes into aggregates. Then the intermediate
routers need only examine the aggregates rather than the
many individual flows. Each aggregate is tested by drop-
ping a few packets from it and observing the response of
that aggregate to the packet drops. Based on these obser-
vations, the routers can estimate the ratio of attack traffic
to the total traffic. To get more accurate results, each in-
termediate router may do multiple tests on each aggregate.
The final step toward fully protecting the victim is to in-
stall a filter to process the traffic being forwarded. This
filter is adaptively designed to have the best match to the
signature or pattern of the attack traffic–i.e., it passes the
packets belonging to clean aggregates with a high prob-
ability, and passes the packets belonging to the polluted
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aggregates with a lower probability. It should also be reit-
erated that the APM or CAPM are intended to be applied
proactively to detect and mitigate a DDoS attack before
significant increase in congestion-induced packet dropping
occurs near the victim.
Pushback introduced in [8] is one of the solutions offered
to mitigate DDoS attacks. In Pushback the signature of the
attack traffic is identified and advertised upstream for the
filtering purpose. The detection of the attack signature
in the conventional pushback is based on the congestion
control mechanism and observing the pattern of dropped
packets or other packets at the congested routers. So the
signature of attack is unknown before congestion happens
as a result of DDoS. However, congestion means an ad-
vanced phase of DDoS. APM or CAPM can contribute to
pushback by detecting the signature of attack in an earlier
phase of a DDoS attack and before congestion happens.
As stated earlier, the signature based on APM or CAPM
is based on which aggregates are more likely to be polluted
by the attack traffic. Therefore, by using APM or CAPM
pushback can act more effectively by not depending on con-
gestion and starting in an earlier phase of the DDoS attack.
B. Congestion Control
Congestion control is the other application of APM and
CAPM. Random Early Drop [2] is one of the popular
approaches to proactively prevent congestion in a router.
However, tuning up the parameters of an RED congestion
controller is a challenging problem. Starting drops very
early causes underutilization of the resources, and doing
drops very late causes this tool cannot work perfectly to
prevent congestion. By utilizing either APM or CAPM a
router collects information about how responsive different
aggregates are -i.e., Ki coefficients defined in the previous
section. By knowing these coefficients, a router can deter-
mine how much it should drop from the aggregate to reduce
its bandwidth to a certain value.
Flash crowds are among the phenomena that can cause
long term congestions in the Internet. In a flash crowd, a
huge number of data packets are flooded toward a destina-
tion (e.g., popular site). The flash crowd may cause very
heavy congestion in the links close to the destination or
other places of the network like border gateways. In prac-
tice it is very likely that most of the flows of a flash crowd
belong to a few aggregates. The response coefficient of ag-
gregates that carry more traffic belonging to the flash crowd
experiences a more decrease, so by filtering the packets be-
longing to these aggregates more aggressively and close to
their sources, the other aggregates can be saved from con-
gestion.
Another strong point of APM and CAPM is fairness. As-
sume a traffic composed of many aggregates is intended to
be forwarded through the same outgoing link at a router,
and the link is close to congestion. So it is desired to keep
the traffic bandwidth within the outgoing link capacity.
Fig. 2. The network topology used for simulation
If the router applies equal drop probability governed by
RED for all aggregates of the traffic, the aggregates with
higher response coefficients will back off more aggressively
compared to the aggregates with smaller response coeffi-
cients. A certain degree of fairness among aggregates can
be achieved by taking into account the response coefficient
of each aggregate. If pl is the assigned drop probability of
an aggregate with response coefficient Kl, then the simplest
heuristic to achieve fairness is to distribute the desired drop
probability of traffic among its aggregates such that Klpl is
constant for all aggregates. So all aggregates of the traffic
make the same average contribution to the rate decrease.
VII. Simulations and Results
We have used the popular network simulator ns2 to per-
form our experiments [9]. As explained previously, our fo-
cus is on TCP aggregates. For simulation we have used
a network with fixed topology similar to that in figure 2.
The nodes S1, S2, . . . , Sn are n sources of conformant TCP
traffic, and n is 50 in our simulations. The propagation
delay of the link between each source and router R1 in fig-
ure 2 is different from a source to another source, and it
has been chosen such that the round trip time of packets is
uniformly distributed between 50 and 100 milliseconds un-
der low congestion conditions. The flows at the sources are
generated according to a birth-death process. Each source
starts a TCP flow, and that flow ends after a random time
uniformly distributed between 0 and 0.15 seconds. That
source starts a new flow after waiting another random time
uniformly distributed between 0 and 0.3 seconds. As shown
in figure 2, there is another source Sa, which is connected
to router R1, and it generates non-conformant traffic and
sends that toward the destination. So both intermediate
routers R1 and R2 receive an aggregate that is a mixture
of conformant and non-conformant flows. The packet size
is constant equal to 1 Kbyte for all flows. In this topology,
the link between R1 and R2, and also the link between
R2 and destination are bottleneck links. The capacity of
these bottleneck links is 100 Mbps, that translates to 12500
packets per second.
In the first experiment, we show how a conformant ag-
gregate responds to packet drops and show how the shape
of a drop function shows up in the aggregate rate. In this
experiment, there is no non-conformant component in the
10


























Fig. 3. a: The rate of aggregate under no perturbation, b: The
aggregate rate under cosine perturbations, and c: The normalized
cosine drop signature
aggregate, and we compare the aggregate rate with and
without perturbations. Figure 3-(a) shows the rate of traf-
fic under no perturbations. The TCP-conformant sources
generate about 4000 packets per second.
In the next experiment, we have used a single cosine drop
signature at R1, while no perturbation is done at R2. The
frequency of drop signature, f1 = 0.5Hz, and its amplitude
is A1 = 100 drops per second. The normalized drop signa-
ture and the resulting aggregate rate can be seen in figure
3-(c) and figure 3-(b) respectively. By comparing the ag-
gregate rate under cosine perturbations in figure 3-(b) and
the aggregate rate in the normal conditions in figure 3-(a),
it can be seen that the drop signature has modulated the
aggregate rate, and the shape of the cosine drop signature
appears in the aggregate rate with 180 degrees of phase
shift.
Useful observations can be done by inspecting the Power
Spectral Density of the aggregate under a cosine pertur-
bation. Figure 4 shows the spectral density of the aggre-
gate rate shown in figure 3-(b) after eliminating its DC
component. One obvious observation is the high peak at
f = 0.5Hz which is a result of the modulation effect of co-
sine drop signature with frequency f = 0.5Hz, but another
useful fact about this figure is that there are not distin-
guishable peaks at the multiples of f = 0.5Hz. This means
that there is no harmonic distortion as a result of nonlin-
earity. Since the system only responds at the frequency
it was perturbed, and the fact that cosines are eigenfunc-
tions of linear systems confirms the linearity of the system
as proved in Lemma 3.
In the next experiment we explore the typical response
of aggregate when two routers perturb it simultaneously.
In this experiment R1 and R2 perturb the aggregate us-
ing different CDMA drop signatures. In the simulation
T = 32 seconds, N = 16, Tc = 2 seconds, and we
have used the rectangular chip waveform. The code of
















Fig. 4. The Power Spectral Density of the aggregate rate under a
cosine perturbation after eliminating its DC component.
R1 is (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1), and that for R2
is (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1). Under this assign-
ment sa1(t) and s
a
2(t) are orthogonal. The resulting nor-
malized drop signatures for R1 and R2 are shown in figure
5-(b) and 5-(c) respectively. In these figures, two periods
of these drop signatures have been plotted. The amplitude
of drop signatures for the two routers, A1 and A2, are the
same and equal to 120 drops per second.
Figure 5-(a) shows the rate of aggregate when the two
routers R1 and R2 perturb the aggregate simultaneously.
It can be seen that the additive shape of the two drop signa-
tures appears on top of the aggregate rate– with 180 degree
phase shift again. In other words, the two drop signatures
modulate the aggregate rate additively. For example, at
around time t = 40, the amplitude of both drop signatures
is zero, and this shows up as an increase in the rate of ag-
gregate as it can be seen in 5-(a) at t = 40. On the other
hand, at time t = 15 or t = 31, the amplitude of both drop
signatures is nonzero, and this shows up as a decrease in
the rate at these two times.
The purpose of next experiment is to verify that under
orthogonality definition of (32), the matched filter output
of a router defined by (42) is not affected by perturbations
done by the other routers. We proved this fact in Lemma
4. Furthermore, we verify the linear dependence of the
matched filter outputs on the amplitude of drop signature
for each router. In this case we use the same CDMA drop
signatures as in the previous experiment, but we change
A1 and A2, the amplitude of the drop signatures of the
two routers. Figure 6-(a) shows y1, the output of matched
filter for R1 as it is defined by (42), when A1 changes from 0
to 160 drops per second. In this figure, each + represents a
test in which R1 perturbs the aggregate with drop signature
r1(t) = A1s1(t) and at the same time R2 is also perturbing
traffic with drop signature r2 = A2s2(t), and A1 = A2.
For each value of A1 several tests have been done, and
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Fig. 5. a: The aggregate rate under two simultaneous perturbations,
b: the normalized drop signature of R1, and c: the normalized
drop signature of R2.
the average over multiple tests has been plotted by the
solid line. It can be seen that the deviation of y1 for each
individual test from the average value shown by solid line is
relatively small; this means that the matched filter output
shows a small variance. The other observation about 6-
(a) is linearity in amplitude of drop signature A1 that we
proved in Lemma 3.
In the other part of this experiment we turn off the per-
turbations done by R2 by setting A2 = 0, and do the same
multiple test and measurement of y1 for each value of A1.
The dashed line in figure 6-(a) shows the average of multi-
ple tests for each value of A1 for this case. It can be seen
that the dashed line is very close to the solid line show-
ing that perturbations of R2 do not affect the output of
matched filter of R1. Also note that the slope of the solid
line or dashed line in figure 6-(a) is K1 defined in equation
(44). We need this quantity as a parameter of estimator
of the non-conformant component of an aggregate in our
next experiment. Figure 6-(b) is the same as figure 6-(a)
for the second router.
In the next experiment we add non-conformant traffic
to the aggregate and try to estimate this non-conformant
component of it by CAPM. In this experiment, we do the
same CDMA-based perturbations as in the previous exper-
iment and use CAPM, but with fixed A1 and A2 equal to
100 drops per second. We use the CAPM estimator intro-
duced in equation (47) and use the values of K1 and K2
found in the previous experiment. In this case the non-
conformant part of traffic sends about 2650 packets per
second, which is about 40 percent of the average total rate
of the aggregate since the TCP-conformant sources send
about 4000 packet per second. Figure 7 shows the results
of this experiment for the two routers. In figure 7-(a), each
+ shows the result of a single test and estimation of the
percentage of non-conformant traffic. The solid line shows
the actual value of this percentage, which is about 40 per-

























Fig. 6. Matched filter output versus the amplitude of drop signature,
a: for the first router, b: for the second router.
cent. The dashed line is the average over all tests. The
figure shows that the result of each estimation is very close
the actual value, and deviation of every single estimation is
about a few percents from the actual value, and the results
of multiple estimations are about the same. This shows
that the estimator has a low variance. Another important
observation about this experiment is that the estimator is
unbiased since after several independent estimations and
taking the average the error tends to zero. Figure 7-(b) is
the same as figure 7-(a) for the second router.
In the last experiment we try to examine the perfor-
mance of the estimator when changing the amount of non-
conformant traffic. In this experiment we start from a fully
conformant aggregate, but later we add non-conformant
traffic to that. Then we use the CDMA based pertur-
bations and use CAPM in order to estimate the percent-
age of non-conformant traffic in the aggregate. The upper
limit for the amount of the non-conformant traffic is the
capacity of bottleneck link. Figure 8 shows the result of
the simulation for the two routers. The vertical axis in
this figure is the percentage of bottleneck link utilization
by the aggregate, the solid line shows the actual percent-
age of non-conformant traffic during the simulation. The
dashed line shows the result of estimator obtained by the
first router, and the + signs show those estimates of the
second router. As it can be seen, the estimator is accurate
to the point where the link utilization is about 80 percent.
After this point the bias of estimator starts to increase.
This behavior can be explained in the following way: as
we get close to the congestion condition, some packets are
dropped from the aggregate and this number increases as
we get closer to congestion condition. So the conformant
component of the aggregate shrinks its rate to respond to
the drops made by congestion control, and as a result, this
component becomes less responsive to the perturbations
done by the APM or CAPM mechanism, and so the algo-
rithm over-estimates the percentage of non-responsive traf-
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Fig. 7. Estimate of the non-conformant percentage of traffic, a: for
the first router, b: for the second router.
fic. Another way of explaining this fact is to see that long
term congestion causes all conformant flows decrease their
window sizes, which causes a change in FW , the PDF of
the window size. This causes an error in estimator since
the estimator uses Ki which depends on stationary PDF of
FW .
Although long term congestion is one factor that may de-
grade the performance of APM or CAPM, the APM and
CAPM show a good performance in a wide range of link
utilization before congestion happens. This can be one of
the strong points about APM and CAPM since these meth-
ods can be applied proactively and prevent congestion that
can be caused by a DDoS or any other reason.
VIII. Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced the Aggregate Perturba-
tion Method (APM), and CDMA-based APM (CAPM) two
techniques for estimating the amount of non-conforming
traffic belonging to a TCP aggregate. Both algorithms
perform a test on the aggregate by dropping some pack-
ets from it and observing the result. APM is the simpler
test but it is not robust to simultaneous tests at different
routers. So we introduced CAPM that uses some unique
drop signature for each router to do the test, and the ap-
proach is similar to the Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
CDMA in communication theory.
One important advantage of APM and CAPM is that
they can be implemented in a distributed manner without
needing data exchange between routers, and furthermore,
these methods do not need any change in the current pro-
tocols. This also permits incremental deployment. One of
the strong points about APM and CAPM is that these al-
gorithms can perform proactively, and prevent congestion
or possible effects of a DDoS attack.
Proper definition of aggregates is critical in the perfor-
mance of the introduced algorithms. More research can be
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Est. of 2nd router
Fig. 8. Performance of CAPM based estimator of non-conformant
traffic versus bottleneck link utilization.
done to find proper schemes of defining aggregates. For
example, the definition of an aggregate may be based on
the type of packets, source network, destination network,
or any other information available in the headers of data
packets. Intuitively, in order to get good performance of
the estimator, the flows contained in an aggregate should
have similar statistical properties in terms of their window
sizes. This causes the responsiveness of the aggregate not
to be dominated by a few large flows. So prior information
about the window size of a flow can be useful to assign it
to a proper aggregate.
References
[1] Floyd, S. and Fall, K., “Promoting the Use of End-to-End Con-
gestion Control in the Internet,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, Vol. 7, No. 4, Aug 1999.
[2] Floyd, S. and Jacobson, V., “Random Early Detection Gateways
for Congestion Avoidance,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Net-
working, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp 397-413, Aug 1993.
[3] Jacobson, V., “Congestion Avoidance and Control,” Proceeding
of SIGCOMM 88, Proceeding of SIGCOMM 88, Aug. 1988.
[4] Schulzrinne, H., “Long Term Internet Traffic Statistics,” avail-
able online at:
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/ hgs/internet/traffic.html/.
[5] Savage, S.; Wetherall, D.; Karlin, A. and Anderson, T., “Network
Support for IP Trace back,” IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking,
June 2001,Vol. 9, No 3.
[6] Stevens, W., “TCP Slow Start, Congestion Avoidance, Fast Re-
transmit and Fast Recovery Algorithms ,” RFC2001, Internet En-
gineering Task Force, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/.
[7] Misra, V.; Gong, W. and Towsley, D., “A fluid based analysis of
a network of AQM routers supporting TCP flows with an appli-
cation to RED ,” Proc. of SIGCOMM 2000, August 2000.
[8] Mahajan, R.; Bellovin, S.; Floyd, S.; Ioannidis, J.; Paxson, V.
and Shenker S., “Controlling
High Bandwidth Aggregates in the Network ,” available online
at: http://www.icir.org/pushback/pushback-Jul01.pdf/.
[9] Network Simulator ns2, online documentation available at:
http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/.
[10] Altman, E.; Avrachenkov, K. and Barakat, C., “A Stochastic
Model of TCP/IP with Stationary Random Losses ,” Proc. of
SIGCOMM 2000, August 2000.
[11] Wu-chang, Feng; Shin K.G.; Kandlur, D.D. and Saha, D.,
“The BLUE active queue management algorithms,” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp 513- 528, Aug
2002.
